COLIDE: A collaborative intrusion detection framework for internet of things by Arshad, Junaid et al.
IET Research Journals
COLIDE: A Collaborative Intrusion
Detection Framework for Internet of Things
ISSN 1751-8644
doi: 0000000000
www.ietdl.org
Junaid Arshad1, Muhammad Ajmal Azad2∗, Mohammad Mahmoud Abdellatif3,Muhammad Habib Ur
Rehman4, Khaled Salah5
School of Computing and Engineering, University of West London, London, United Kingdom
School of Computing, Newcastle University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom
Faculty of Engineering, The British University in Egypt, Cairo, Egypt
Department of Computer Science, National University of Computer and Emerging Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan
ECE Department, Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
* E-mail: muhammad.azad@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract: Internet of Things (IoT) represent a network of resource-constrained sensor devices connected through the open Inter-
net which are susceptible to misuse by intruders. Proliferation of IoT across diverse application domains renders their security
critical to ensure normal service delivery by such infrastructures. Traditional standalone intrusion detection systems are tasked
with monitoring device behaviours to identify malicious activities. These systems not only require extensive network and system
resources but also cause delays in detecting a malicious actor due to unavailability of a comprehensive view of the intruder’s activ-
ities. Collaboration among IoT devices enables considering knowledge from a collection of host and network devices to achieve
improved detection accuracy in a timely manner. However, collaboration introduces the challenge of energy efficiency and event
processing which is particularly significant for resource-constrained devices. In this paper, we present an intrusion detection frame-
work for IoT (COLIDE) that leverages collaboration among resource-constrained sensor devices and border nodes for effective and
timely detection of intruders. The paper presents a detailed description of the proposed framework along with its formal description
and analysis to assess its effectiveness for a typical IoT system. We implemented the COLIDE framework with Contiki OS and
conducted thorough experimentation to evaluate its performance. This evaluation demonstrates efficiency of COLIDE framework
with respect to energy and processing overheads achieving effectiveness within an IoT system.
1 Introduction
The use of sensor devices has increased dramatically over the last
few years leading to their proliferation across diverse domains such
as wearables, intelligent appliances, and vehicles. As these devices
have the ability to be connected to the Internet, it introduces exciting
possibilities such as the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT has received
significant attention as a disruptive technology and is considered
fundamental to the networks of the future. A recent study by the
Gartner has predicted the number of sensor devices to increase to
more than 20 billion devices by the year 2020 [1]. This has a direct
impact on industrial applications such as automotive industry, com-
mercial security cameras, as well as consumer applications such as
wearables, smart TVs, and smart meters.
A typical IoT network consists of devices with resource con-
straints such as limited processing power, energy resources, and
communication range etc. These constraints mandate an IoT net-
work to have an efficient communication protocol that requires lim-
ited energy overheads, provides efficient performance under diverse
conditions, and supports larger address space. To this extent, 6LoW-
PAN (IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks)
[2],[3],[4], allows resource-constrained sensor devices to send and
receive communication events as IPv6 packets over IEEE 802.15.4
based networks. Additionally, 6LoWPAN facilitates communication
among low power wireless personal area networks using IPv6 by
performing header compression and fragmentation [5]. This enables
the things to still use IP based Internet, leveraging standards and
technologies developed over the last few decades. For a typical
LoWPAN, this connectivity is achieved by using an edge router
which facilitates connectivity among the devices participating within
a LoWPAN as well as with the Internet.
However, the open network architecture of IoT has also attracted
intruders to use the network of thousands of devices for spreading
malicious content. Due to the proliferation of such devices in almost
every aspect of our life, the threats posed due to their insufficient
security are unique with insecure devices exposing the end users
to serious security and privacy threats. For instance, if an attacker
is able to compromise an in-car WiFi, all in-car devices and data
will be at risk. Once inside the network, an attacker can spoof the
car, connect to outside data sources, and steal the owner’s personal
information including credit card data [6]. With regards to 6LoW-
PAN implementation, most of the IoT security threats originate from
the 802.15.4, IP network and its adaptation layer. Therefore, the
challenge for an effective and secure intrusion detection system for
a 6LoWPAN based IoT network is two-fold: firstly, these devices
are typically resource-constrained which limits their ability to host
sophisticated security system that can monitor the device in real
time. Secondly, the ad-hoc nature of 6LoWPAN networks allows
devices to connect to other devices at runtime, typically for short
time periods, thereby creating a dynamic network.
A number of efforts have been made to address security for IoT
in general and with respect to intrusion detection in particular [7–
9]. However, these are generally focused at standalone intrusion
detection components which are integrated with the sensor device
or the high-powered device such as cluster head. These approaches
are limited in that they consider a restricted view of the events
within an IoT network and therefore are limited in their ability to
address complex, multi-stage, coordinated, and distributed attacks.
We believe that collaboration in intrusion detection enables end
devices to use the collective information from the number of devices
to have more accurate and wider overview of the characteristics of
IP traffic passing through them.
In this paper, we build on our existing work [10] and present a
COLlaborative Intrusion DEtection (COLIDE) framework for IoT
networks. In particular, the framework envisages collective use of
information from the host and network-based detection systems. The
detection system is divided into two layers: an edge router layer, and
an end-host/node layer. The end-host component monitors the events
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Fig. 1: A typical 6LoWPAN system
at the node level and reports anomalous events to the network/edge
router level system to correlate the alerts to perform aggregate detec-
tion. We believe correlating alerts from multiple devices will not
only minimize false positive rate and improve the detection rate
under distributed attacks, but will also reduce the workload at the end
host. Therefore, the proposed framework is envisioned to address
challenges such as the flexibility, resource constraints of the nodes,
and collaborative nature of the IoT networks.
The overall contributions made by this paper are presented below.
• A novel intrusion detection framework for IoT networks
focused on achieving efficient intrusion detection through collabo-
ration between host and network-based intrusion detection.
• Efficient detection of complex, multi-stage attacks achieved
via collaboration between sensor nodes and the edge router.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the background on intrusion detection systems and 6LowPAN along
with an attack model for the IoT networks highlighting specific
threats addressed by the COLIDE framework. Section 3 presents
the related work regarding intrusion detection within an IoT net-
work. Section 4 presents our collaborative approach and its formal
representation and analysis using Z notation. Section 5 presents the
implementation of the setup that we propose followed by the perfor-
mance evaluation of the proposed framework in section 6. Section
7 provides discussion of properties of proposed system. Finally,
section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Threat Model
In this section, we present basic concepts used throughout the rest
of this paper which are important to understand the proposed sys-
tem. Furthermore, we include an attack model identifying the threats
addressed by the COLIDE framework.
2.1 Ipv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks
(6LoWPANs)
A major factor in the uptake of IoT is its ability to integrate sensor
devices with the Internet allowing them to communicate with other
devices and systems. These devices typically include automation
and home appliances creating Low Power Wireless Personal Area
Networks (LoWPANs).
One of the most commonly used technology for LoWPAN is
IEEE802.15.4 [11]. This standard describes the PHY and MAC layer
requirement for a low rate, low-power wireless embedded radio com-
munication. It is capable of operating in three different frequency
band namely, 2400 MHz ISM, 915 MHz ISM and 868 MHz European
band. The MAC layer protocol is responsible for achieving efficient
sharing of channel bandwidth and the quantity of energy required
for efficient communication. MAC layer module controls the way
packets are transmitted and received. Generally, two approaches are
used in the literature to classify different types of protocol for trans-
mission and reception of packets in the channel i.e. the reservation
and the contention based protocols. The reservation-based protocols
attempt to optimize energy and throughput by dividing the network
into clusters referred to as Personal Area Networks (PANs). Each
PAN will have a cluster head that coordinates the transmissions
among the nodes within the PAN. Whereas the contention based
approach uses Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance
(CSMA/CA) and focuses on detecting medium activity in the chan-
nel. When using CSMA/CA mechanism, a node tries to sense the
medium before transmitting the packet. If another node is already
sending through the medium it withdraws itself to avoid a collision
when there is high traffic. In order for these devices to connect to
the Internet, they each need to have a unique IP address. IPv4 has
many limitations such as the address size which limits the number of
connected devices. This is easily solved by using IPv6. IPv6 nodes
are assigned 128 bit IP addresses in a hierarchical manner, through
a network prefix of arbitrary length. IEEE 802.15.4 devices may
use either of IEEE 64-bit extended addresses or, after an association
event, 16-bit addresses that are unique within a PAN.
A significant problem within this context is that IPv6 requires the
maximum transmission unit (MTU) to be at least 1280 octets. In
contrast, IEEE 802.15.4’s standard packet size is 127 octets. A max-
imum frame overhead of 25 octets spares 102 octets at the media
access control layer. An optional but highly recommended security
feature at the link layer poses an additional overhead. For example,
21 octets are consumed for AES-CCM-128 leaving only 81 octets
for upper layers. In order to solve this, 6LowPAN adaptation layer
was introduced.
6LoWPAN [12] is a technology standard defined by IETF to
enable IPv6 stack to smoothly operate over IEEE 802.15.4 MAC
link layer. As an adaptation layer, it compresses all headers includ-
ing, 40 Bytes of IPv6 header from the network and 8 Bytes of UDP
header from the transport into a few bytes. For IPv6 frames to be
transmitted over IEEE 802.15.4 radio links, the IPv6 frames have
to be divided into partitions and more data generated to resem-
ble the original format. During packet retrieval, additional data is
removed to maintain the original format. 6LoWPAN supports rout-
ing in the network and link layer.The link layer uses mesh-under
while the network layer uses route-over. In mesh-under routing, the
adaptation layer sends packets through multiple radio hops, while
the route over scheme performs routing at the network layer with the
nodes acting as a router. Thus, every hop in the link represents an
IP hop to send packets across the links. Figure 1 shows the architec-
ture of 6LoWPAN network, host devices can be either fixed (static)
or mobile, depending on the application design. The edge router
handles communication between 6LoWPAN devices, Internet, and
other IP networks. It manages maintenance and generation of 6LoW-
PAN subnets and also handles data exchange between devices in the
network.
2.2 Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Network
As 6LoWPAN networks are expected to be densely populated. Pack-
ets will need to be routed throughout the network to reach their
destination. Several routing protocols have been proposed by the
6LoWPAN community. However, only two routing protocols are
currently legitimate for large-scale deployments: LOADng [13], and
RPL [14]. This work is performed using Routing Protocol for Low
Power and Lossy Network (RPL).
RPL is an IPv6-based Routing Protocol for LowPANs, designed
by IETF Routing Over Low Power and Lossy network (ROLL)
working group. It is a distance-vector routing protocol that operates
on top of IEEE 802.15.4 Physical and Data Link layers. It organizes
nodes in a Destination-Oriented-Acyclic-Graph (DODAG), where
each router identifies a set of parents, each of which is a potential
next hop on a path towards the root of the DODAG. The pre-
ferred parent is selected based on a metric or constraint among other
candidates. RPL supports different kinds of network traffic, which
includes; point to point, multi-point-to-point, and point to multi-
point communication. RPL supports bidirectional links that enable
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Fig. 2: Attack Model for Internet of Things Network.
uplink and downlink traffics. Each of the nodes in the network com-
prises of the Low Power and Lossy Network border router (LBR),
the routers and the host. During network formation, RPL creates
a tree-like topology with the border router serving as the root and
the routers and host forming the edges to propagating information
up and down the link of the network. Each node in RPL network
has a rank, which states its position relative to other nodes with the
LBR having a rank of minimum rank value, then the rank increases
towards the leaves of the DODAG. The rank value is computed using
the objective function. The objective function contains the routing
metrics and objectives used in forming the network.
IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoW-
PAN) [3],[4] has a profound role in this. 6LoWPAN is a networks
technology that allows IPv6 packets to be carried efficiently within
small link layer frames such as those defined by IEEE 802.15.4. This
enables the much sought after integration of sensor devise within a
WPAN with the Internet thereby realising the long-term objective
of the Internet of "Things". A graphical representation of a typical
6LoWPAN is provided in Fig. 1. Typically, the Internet connectivity
for the "things" is handled by a wireless access point whereas the
6LoWPAN network is connected to the IPv6 network using an edge
router which handles: data exchange between 6LowPAN devices and
the Internet, local data exchange between devices inside the 6LoW-
PAN, and generation and maintenance of radio subnet.
2.3 Threat Model for the Internet of Things
Although the IoT is an emerging paradigm, a significant part of the
software stack used by the IoT applications is adopted from the exist-
ing computing paradigms. This is also evident from the integration
of IoT specific stack (such as specific to 6LoWPAN and RPL) [15]
with the existing Internet infrastructure such as IPv4 and IPv6. Con-
sequently, an attack model for IoT infrastructures is not restricted to
the threats specific to the new routing protocols such as 6LoWPAN
and RPL but also includes threats to existing infrastructure such as
IPv6, application specific attacks and attacks specific to the physical
media such as the radio spectrum. The attack model for a typical IoT
network is presented in Figure 2.
Our research is aimed at developing a collaborative intrusion
detection system for IoT infrastructures. Therefore, we focus on two
types of threats for this paper i.e. routing-specific and software or
application specific threats. As our proposed system is a software
entity, we render the threats at the physical layer out of scope of this
research.
2.3.1 Routing-specific attacks: Routing attacks directly impact
the low power devices and their routing tables. This can be achieved
by making the flooding or denial of service attacks with respect
to routing tables. Potential routing attacks for an IoT system are
presented below.
Rank attack: 6LoWPAN networks use ranking to establish opti-
mal routing path. Within this context, Node Rank indicates the
quality of the path from a node to the sink node. Every time a node
updates its rank or preferred parent, it needs to inform other nodes by
sending the updated information in the next cycle. RPL uses the rank
rule such that a node in the parent should always have a lower rank
than its children to prevent the loop creation. This enables creating
an optimal topology, preventing loop creation and manage control
overhead [16]. As identified by [16–18] the rank information can be
maliciously tampered with by an attacker so that it chooses the node
with worst rank to be its parent. This will result in disrupting the
topology of the network causing delays in normal transmission.
Wormhole attack: A wormhole can be considered as a tunnel
between two nodes using wired or wireless links and can be used
to achieve faster transmission rates or dedicated connection between
such nodes. As such, a wormhole has legitimate applications such
as the connection between the local and global IDS modules within
our architecture. However, a wormhole as identified by [19], can be
used by an attacker to create a dedicated tunnel with a node on the
Internet. Wormhole attack is not novel to the IoT networks and has
been historically identified as a potential threat for wireless sensor
networks[20–22].
Sinkhole attack: The objective of a sinkhole attack is to attract
traffic through a designated node using illegitimate information mak-
ing the node a lucrative routing sink (base station within wireless
network terminology). As with wormhole attack, literature around
sinkhole attack is well established with [23] being an initial effort
to identify and mitigate against such attack. Creating a sinkhole
does not necessarily disrupt legitimate transmission within a 6LoW-
PAN. However, diverting the traffic through a specific route creates
opportunities to launch other attacks such as wormhole and selective
forwarding attack described below.
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–12
c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2015 3
Selective forwarding attack: With selective forwarding attack, a
malicious node attempts to disrupt legitimate transmission and rout-
ing path. The malicious node, in this case, attempts to block certain
packets and forward selected packets thereby affecting the routing.
For instance, an attacker can forward all RPL control messages
but block the rest [19]. This attack can cause more damage when
used in conjunction with sinkhole attack. Such dependencies among
different attack types have motivated us to explore the impact of
multi-stage attacks within IoT infrastructures. To the best of our
knowledge, the intrusion detection system presented in this paper
is a pioneering effort to identify this issue and explore a solution to
mitigate against it especially for IoT systems.
Fragment duplication attack: The fragment duplication attack
leverages a weakness within the 6LoWPAN layer with respect to
how fragmented packets are received and assembled by an IoT node.
A consequence of the integration of 6LoWPAN with IPv6 networks
is that bigger packets supported by IPv6 have to be fragmented into
smaller packets so as to be effectively processed by the resource-
constrained nodes within an IoT system. However, as identified by
[24], a recipient node cannot verify if two fragments of a packet were
sent from the same source. Therefore, the recipient node is unable to
distinguish between legitimate and spoofed fragments. A malicious
node can exploit this vulnerability to block reassembly of targeted
packets such as connection establishment packets. This may result in
disrupting legitimate traffic as well as depleting resources available
to the victim node.
Buffer reservation attack: The buffer reservation attack is closely
linked to the fragment duplication attack and may be caused as a
consequence of a successful fragment duplication attack. The buffer
reservation attack also targets the vulnerability in the fragmenta-
tion mechanism employed by 6LoWPAN networks. As identified by
[24], it leverages the fact that the recipient of a fragmented packet
is unable to determine if all fragments will be received correctly.
Therefore, a recipient node reserves a buffer space based on the
information provided in the 6LoWPAN header with any additional
fragments discarded. Taking advantage of this setting, a malicious
node can send its victim single FRAG1 to reserve arbitrary buffer
space thereby consuming scarce memory of the resource-constrained
node.
Sybil and clone ID attack: Sybil and clone ID attacks are similar
in that the objective of the attacker is to use spoofed logical identities
within a network without deploying physical devices. In particular,
for clone ID attack, an attacker is aiming to use a victim’s logical
identity within the network. Whereas, in Sybil attack, the attacker
aims to assume multiple logical identities within a network without
deploying physical nodes. These logical identities may not be cur-
rently present in the network. A number of existing efforts such as
[19] and [23] have identified these attacks for IoT and historically
for wireless sensor networks.
2.3.2 Application Specific Threats: In addition to routing spe-
cific threats mentioned above, IoT infrastructures are susceptible to
other types of threats such as application specific threats. Although
routing forms an essential component of the IoT system, the IoT
devices are expected to run application software required by the
function envisaged to be performed. We categorize these threats
as application specific and present them below. Denial of service
attack: Historically, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are used to
make the victim unavailable for legitimate service. This can be
achieved via flooding the victim with the extraordinarily large vol-
ume of requests or by exhausting the resources such as memory and
computational power available to the victim. Within IoT, the threat
of DoS attack is two-fold: the victim can be part of the network under
threat that an attacker wishes to make unavailable or the victim can
be used as a zombie (stepping stone) to launch a Distributed DoS
(DDoS) on a target IoT network. The significance of these threats
within IoT systems have been identified by [25–27]
Malicious code injection: As identified by [26] and [28], mali-
cious code injection is another application specific threat to IoT
systems. The attacker, in this case, attempts to inject malicious code
to get privileged access to the victim. Consequently, the attacker can
damage the normal operation by causing a threat to the data or to
the network using one of the routing specific attacks described in the
previous section.
Traditional subversion attacks: In addition to the above-
mentioned attacks, IoT systems are vulnerable to the existing attacks
targeted at computer systems such as message interception, fab-
rication, modification, subversion, and phishing etc. As with the
routing-specific attacks, these attacks can also form a part of a more
complicated and sophisticated attack.
3 Intrusion Detection within IoT Systems
The history of intrusion detection within IoT networks has its foun-
dations within the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) where the
focus has mostly been on identifying and mitigating against threats
affecting routing protocols. The routing protocols within such net-
works were optimized to work within a resource-constrained envi-
ronment and therefore prioritize performance over security [29].
With the introduction of LoWPAN and RPL networks, sensor net-
works are now connected to the contemporary IP network resulting
in expansion of the attack surface of such networks. Therefore,
such networks are not only vulnerable to malicious attempts tar-
geting routing protocols but also to the contemporary internet-based
attacks such as code-injection, DoS, and phishing - we presented a
bespoke attack model for IoT networks in the previous section. We
believe, the cutting edge efforts in IDS for IoT networks should take
these considerations into account to mitigate against such malicious
attempts.
Within this context, we present an overview of existing efforts for
intrusion detection in IoT systems. Although our research identified
linkage between Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) and IoT systems,
however, we do not include literature items related to intrusion detec-
tion in WSN. This is because the type and volume of attacks faced
by IoT systems are significantly different from that of WSN mainly
due to IP connectivity as highlighted by the threat model presented
in the previous section.
[30] presents one of the early efforts to establish an IDS for
IoT where authors proposed a host-based IDS for LoWPANs using
Contiki OS [14] and 6LowPAN [3],[4]. The IDS is able to per-
form detection based on the information at the node level and then
transmit data to some centralized system for further analysis. The
detection system performs detection using information collected
from individual nodes and does not consider the information from
other nodes in the network. The system does not show effective
detection under the distributed denial of service attack that not only
overwhelms the device but also congests the communication channel
between nodes and the centralized system.
Kasinathan et al [31] presented an IDS framework for 6LoWPAN
which was able to detect denial of service attacks by monitoring
physical parameters of the device. In [32] authors proposed a dis-
tributed system architecture for detecting the version number attacks
in RPL-based networks and identify malicious nodes. Furthermore, a
number of intrusion detection system architectures have been devel-
oped in [33, 34] for the resource-constrained 6LoWPAN devices
based systems focusing on the sinkhole and selective-forwarding
attacks (well-known attacks within 6LoWPAN networks). Our work
is different from these systems, as it provides a generic framework
for intrusion detection within IoT networks which is capable of
working with diverse devices addressing a range of issues including
different types of attacks, the inherent flexibility of the IoT networks,
and the lack of trust among the participant devices.
An architecture to protect against DoS attacks within 6LoWPANs
has been presented in [35] where the system uses network-level traf-
fic and attack signature to identify malicious traffic. Moreover, Jun
and Chi addressed the problem of processing a significant volume
of alerts and network traffic as a part of intrusion detection in [36].
The authors identified the challenge of a significant volume of net-
work traffic within a limited time to be processed by an intrusion
detection module and proposed to use established Complex Event
Processing (CEP) techniques to address this challenge. The work
presented is different from our proposed system mainly due to the
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focus of research. For the proposed system, we focus on a generic
IoT system which can include devices of any types (constrained
or unconstrained) whereas the authors in [31, 37] have specifically
designed the system for constrained devices. Furthermore, as a part
of our proposed system, we envision to work within an untrust-
worthy and flexible environment where different devices can come
together without previous handshakes to deliver a certain service in
a coordinated manner.
A number of machine learning systems have also been proposed
for detecting malicious nodes in an IoT network [38–41]. However,
measuring behaviour patterns of device usage and processing it via
multistage neural networks could have a high-energy consumption.
Additionally, the intrusion detection based on a machine learning
system would require having a database of malicious and normal
signatures at the IoT node, which is again not feasible due to the
high memory consumption. The confidentiality and integrity of the
data exchanged between IoT devices and the core system can be pro-
tected through the use of cryptography mechanism [42]. However,
the energy resources required for encrypting the data makes these
approaches infeasible to be deployed in a real system implementa-
tion. A number of trust and reputation based systems have also been
proposed for analysing the reputation of the nodes in such network.
For instance, Azad et al [43] presented a reputation aggregation sys-
tem for devices in the IoT network that is then used to identify the
malicious devices without affecting the privacy of the participants.
Furthermore, Roux et al [44] proposed an approach to character-
ize the behaviour of legitimate and non-legitimate communications
based on the profiling and monitoring of the Radio Signal Strength
Indication (RSSI) associated with the wireless transmissions of the
connected objects. A number of trust based systems have also been
proposed that compute the reputation of devices by considering
the social connectivity network of devices and similarity measure
between device feedback [45–47]. In [48], authors proposed a game
theory based technique to perform the anomaly detection in the IoT
network by matching the attack signature. The authors further devel-
oped the reputation model based on the game theory to minimize the
false positive rate incurred because of signature matching.
Our research has identified a number of existing solutions
designed for resource-constrained devices i.e. RPL devices that pro-
cess the packets at the centralized or local level. The solutions that
are able to exploit the RPL mechanisms will be more energy efficient
while providing satisfactory detection performances with respect
to version number attacks. These systems normally consider the
local network-agnostic view of the major events in the neighbor-
hood devices. We believe that monitoring and intrusion detection
systems should be generic and can be applied to any type of IoT
devices independent of routing protocols. In view of this, the intru-
sion detection framework proposed in this paper does not focus on
specific devices. We believe that being agnostic of the device types
our proposed framework can achieve applicability in wider scenarios
and application domains.
Furthermore, an IDS should take into account local and global
levels of monitoring i.e. perform detection in a collaborative way.
The collaborative system would allow devices to interact with each
other or with a centralized system to get useful information which
can be used for intrusion detection. Within this context, our pro-
posed system implements collaboration between host and network
level intrusion detection components to achieve a comprehensive
view of the events. We believe this setting is paramount in enabling
our proposed framework to perform efficient detection of complex
multi-stage attacks.
4 The COLIDE Framework
We believe that effective intrusion detection is fundamental to
achieving overall security for IoT. Within this context, we propose
a collaborative intrusion detection system for IoT infrastructures
(COLIDE) which takes into account unique characteristics of IoT
systems and emphasizes the cooperative nature of such systems. A
graphical representation of our proposed framework is presented in
Fig 3.
As depicted in Fig 3, the COLIDE framework proposes to conduct
intrusion detection at two levels i.e. the node, and the edge router.
These are described below in more detail.
Node level detection: The node level detection module is envi-
sioned to be a lightweight module in accordance with the relatively
constrained resources available at individual sensors nodes. How-
ever, the resource-constrained nature of sensor nodes should not
prohibit implementing node-level intrusion detection as the visi-
bility offered by a node level system is unique and can improve
the overall intrusion detection. In this regard, we propose using
signature-based intrusion detection within nodes due to their effi-
ciency with respect to computational resources as compared with
anomaly-based detection. Furthermore, the choice of implementa-
tion for network vs host-based monitoring at node level is rendered
application specific as it will influence the type of attacks that can be
detected. For instance, a Denial of Service (DoS) attack targeted to
flood nodes within a LoWPAN can be detected by monitoring net-
work traffic. Whereas a backdoor channel attack targeted at gaining
unauthorized access to a node can be detected by monitoring system
events. Therefore, the detection engine for the node level module
processes the information generated by the monitor(s) using existing
signatures to detect any attack attempts.
Edge router detection: An edge router is an important com-
ponent of an IoT system as it enables connectivity between the
LoWPAN(s) and the Internet. With emerging infrastructures such as
Fog and Edge Computing [49], the significance of edge routers has
increased with multiple services such as firewalls, and traffic filters
etc. being implemented at these devices. This has been possible due
to increased computing capabilities of these devices. Inspired by the
Fog computing paradigm, we envisage leveraging the capabilities of
edge routers to achieve rigorous intrusion detection for IoT systems.
To this extent, the edge router detection module is designed to moni-
tor traffic for LoWPAN(s) attached to it, therefore, monitoring traffic
for all the devices within a LoWPAN. Among others, this enables
detection of attacks targeting an entire LoWPAN due to the level of
visibility offered by the edge router. Within the proposed system, the
edge router detection module has three components: Alert Collector,
Correlation Agent, and Detection Agent.
As an edge router is expected to monitor all the sensor devices
within a LoWPAN, a method is required to identify threats to indi-
vidual sensors. Alert Collector (AC) is expected to achieve this
function by communicating with individual IoT devices to gather
alerts from the node level monitoring components. Due to the func-
tion of this component, an alert collector will be implemented
using multi-threading as it will be communicating with multiple
IoT devices simultaneously. A typical intrusion is usually not an
isolated event that can be achieved within a single transaction or
network event but it is usually a series of steps each of which may
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Fig. 3: A collaborative intrusion detection system for IoT.
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target a specific vulnerability with the aim to achieve the overall
successful intrusion [50, 51]. Correlation Agent (CA) component is
devised to facilitate countermeasure for such attacks by correlating
malicious events at network and system levels as monitored by the
node level monitors. This enables improved visibility into the events
within IoT devices and facilitates the overall intrusion detection
process. Historically, anomaly-based intrusion detection approaches
have demonstrated better efficiency especially with respect to the
detection of complex, multistage, and zero-day attacks however at
the cost of increased resource consumption. Due to the increased
capability of edge router devices, we, therefore, propose imple-
menting anomaly-based intrusion detection at the edge router. The
Detection Engine (DE) component at the edge router is expected to
achieve this by making use of the alerts collected and correlated by
the alert collector and alert correlation components.
In order to facilitate efficient implementation of our proposed
framework and to assess its effectiveness, we have used the Z
notation to represent our framework in formal representation. As
described above, the COLIDE framework is composed of two major
modules i.e. Node level and Edge Router module. Formal description
for each of these is presented below.
4.1 Node level Module
In order to achieve a coherent representation across the different lev-
els of security alerts, we consider the term event to represent an
instance at the system or network level.
Let us define an event within a given host H as Ehi. As the proposed
system is flexible in terms of implementation of the host-based com-
ponent, this event can represent a system event such as a system
call or a networking event such as a network packet. In both sce-
narios, Ehi will be composed of a number of parameters which will
be important to decide if an event is malicious or non-malicious.
For instance, for a network packet, these parameters can include
protocol, inter-arrival time, packet size etc. Therefore, Ehi can be
represented as:
Ehi : {p1, p2, p3, · · · pn}
where pn is a specific parameter for an event.
Within the context of the above scenario, the Detection Engine
DE is expected to categorize Eh as malicious or non-malicious. The
intrusion detection policy Ph is envisioned to contribute towards this
decision. Therefore, if SEhi represents the state of an event Ehi, the
following can be represented as the intrusion detection function.
SEhi : DE(Ehi,Ph)
We define the following data models to be used throughout our
formal description.
EH: a set of events for the host H
SE: state of an event; it can be malicious or non-malicious
P: Detection policy
EVENTS: a set of all the events forwarded to the CA
MEVENTS: set of malicious events forwarded to the CA
HOSTS: a set of hosts within a LoWPAN
PRECOND: a set of pre-conditions
POSTCOND: a set of post-conditions
DEPEND: a set of dependencies among malicious events
[Node Level Intrusion Detection]
∆HostID
EHID? : N
EHi? : EH
PHi? : PH
SEHi? : SE
EHID > 0
EH 6=<>
PH 6=<>
SH 6=<>
if EHi ∈ EH then
SEHi = DE(EHi,PHi)
if SEHi = Malicious then
Intrusion Response(EHi, SEHi)
4.2 Edge Router module
The edge router module called the Global Detection Enactor (GDE)
has three subcomponents i.e. Detection Agent, Correlation Agent
(CA) and Alert Collector (AC). As the GDE is responsible for a
LoWPAN, it is expected to monitor hosts within that LoWPAN.
Let us define HOSTS as the set of hosts monitored by a GDE
where H is a specific instance within this set. As described in the
previous section, each host is expected to implement a node level
detection engine DEi which is tasked with categorizing events within
that host as malicious or non-malicious. The AC is expected to
gather this stream of events EH from the DE to be processed within
the GDE. One of the significant tasks performed by the GDE is
the CA i.e. to correlate multiple events to identify any multi-stage
attacks. This is a complex task and is achieved by taking into account
dependencies between individual events.
In order to illustrate the significance of the dependencies between
different malicious events considers the following example from
[52].
ME1=SadmindPing: (VictimIP, VictimPort, ExistsHost(VictimIP),
VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP)),
and
ME2=SadmindBufferOverflow: (VictimIP, VictimPort, Exist-
sHost(VictimIP) ∧ VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP), GainrootAc-
cess(VictimIP)).
For ME1 pre-cond can be described as:
({VictimIP,VictimPort},ExistsHost(VictimIP)), which means
that it requires a valid VictimIP and VictimPort to be successful
in its operation i.e. ping. The post − cond for the same event can
be described as {VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP)} which means that
a successful ping can result in the discovery of a vulnerable ser-
vice for the victim host represented by VictimIP. For ME2, pre-cond
can be described as {VictimIP,VictimPort}, ExistsHost(VictimIP) ∧
VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP) which means that it requires a
valid VictimIP, VictimPort and availability of a vulnerable vic-
tim service. The post − cond for this event is described as
{GainrootAccess(VictimIP)} which means that a successful buffer
overflow, in this case, can result in gaining root access for the victim.
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[Evaluate Dependencies]
∆Correlation Agent
EHi? : EVENTS
MEHi? : MEVENTS
H? : HOSTS
pre− cond? : PRE − COND
post − cond? : POST − COND
dependencies! :<>
MEHi? ∈ MEVENTS
MEVENTS 6=<>
PRE − COND 6=<>
POST − COND 6=<>
if pre− cond? = post − cond then
dependencies = dependencies ∪MEHi?
The above description of the pre and post conditions for the two
malicious events result in the identification of a relationship between
the two seemingly distinct events. We use the above description
to highlight the role of dependencies between different steps of an
attack which help identifying a complex multi-stage attack. Within
the context of the proposed scheme, we use the concept of dependen-
cies among individual events within a 6LoWPAN network to detect
a complex attack attempt.
Let us define EVENTS as the set of all the events monitored by
CA and MEVENTS as the set of events identified as malicious by the
node level DE. Furthermore, the pre and post conditions are repre-
sented by [PRE − COND] and [POST − COND], the CA populates
a directed graph using the dependencies identified among the mali-
cious events. The set of these malicious events is represented by
[DEPEND] in the formal system specification.
The principle followed to establish this set is borrowed from the
domain of alert correlation [53] and is as follows: in order to estab-
lish these dependencies, each malicious event is considered as a tuple
represented as ME = (EHi, pre− cond, post − cond). As described
earlier, the parameters pre-cond and post-cond are established at the
policy definition stage for intrusion detection using system call based
policies. Now, for each malicious event MEj occurring at time tj , a
malicious event MEi occurring at time ti is dependent on if and only
if (MEi.post − cond = MEj.pre− cond)(ti < tj). This establishes a
directed acyclic graph where the nodes represent malicious events
and the edges represent the relationship between these events.
[Detection Engine]
∆Correlation Agent
MEHi?,MEHj? : MEVENTS
EHi? : EVENTS
dependencies− evaluation :
(EHi,PRE − COND,POST − COND)→ PDEPEND
devent : DEPEND
MEVENTS 6=<>
DEPEND 6=<>
if (MEHi.post − cond = MEHj.pre− cond) ∧ (ti < tj) then
Intrusion Response(MEHi,MEHj)
The functional description for the detection engine is explained
above via the Z-notation. The dependency evaluation described ear-
lier is the core pre-requisite for the detection engine as it identifies
the linkages between different malicious events. The dataset of such
dependencies is presented by the set DEPEND. Given the defini-
tions for MEH, postCOND, preCOND, ti and tj, the detection engine
seeks to identify the correlation between the individual malicious
events and executes appropriate, predefined intrusion response if the
dependencies are valid.
4.3 Formal evaluation
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed
intrusion detection scheme for M2M networks, formal analysis of
the scheme has been performed. The formal specification of the pro-
posed intrusion detection scheme presented in section 4.1 and 4.2
has been used as a reference for these proofs. The formal analy-
sis aims to assess the resilience of the proposed system to mitigate
against multi-stage attacks. We prove the system resilience against
multi-stage attacks.
This property represents the evaluation of the scheme with respect
to mitigation against multi-stage attacks. It can be formally repre-
sented as under.
((∃1 Ehi | DE(Ehi)) ∧ (¬ΣDE(Ehi))) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
In order to prove this, we can divide this into two parts. For the
first part,
⇔ (∃1 Ehi|(Ehi)) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
From specification,
∀Ehi | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS • (MEHi.postcond = MEHj.precond) ∧ (ti <
tj) | (SHEi = Malicious ∧ SHEi=Malicious)
⇔ DE(Ehi) ∧ SHEi= Malicious
⇔ DE(EHi) | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ∧ Ehi ∈ DEPEND ∧ SHEi=Malicious
⇔ DE(EHi) | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ∧ Ehi ∈ DEPEND ∧ DE(Ehi) | Ehi ∈
DEPEND
⇔ DE(EHi) | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ∧ Ehi ∈ DEPEND ∧ DE(Ehi)
∈ DEPEND • dependencies′ = dependencies ∪ (Ehi)
⇔ (Ehi.postcond = Ehj.precond) ∧ j > i
⇔ ¬(∃1 Ehi | (Ehi))
âG˘Tˇ false⇔ false
The above analysis proves that the hypothesis ⇔ ¬(∃1 Ehi |
DE(Ehi)) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS i.e. the intrusion detection performed
at the edge router level takes into account multiple events and the
dependencies among them.
Now the second part can be written as under. (¬ΣDE(Ehi)) •
Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
From specification,
∀Ehi | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS • (MEHi.postcond = MEHj.precond) ∧ (ti <
tj) | (SHEi = Malicious ∧ SHEi = Malicious)
⇔ DE(Ehi) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS⇔ DE(Ehi) + DE(dependencies→
Indivdamage)
⇔ DE(Ehi) + DE(dependencies→ Indivdamage)∧ : νFDEPEND •
DEPEND 6=<>
⇔ DE(Ehi) + ΣMEdi,DE(Medi) •
Medi ∈ dependencies • DEPEND neq <>
⇔ DE(Ehi) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
⇔ false
The above analysis proves the hypothesis (¬ΣDE(Ehi)) •
EhiΣMEVENTS to be false i.e. the intrusion detection decision eval-
uated by the proposed scheme does not take into account the
legitimacy of each malicious event, to be false. From the above anal-
ysis, it can be concluded that the hypothesis is not valid for the
proposed intrusion detection scheme. This is proved as both the con-
ditions necessary for the hypothesis to be true have been found false
in accordance with the formal specification of the intrusion detec-
tion scheme. Therefore the effectiveness of the intrusion detection
scheme to correctly evaluate an intrusion whilst taking into account
potential multiple stages of the intrusion is validated. However, as
has been highlighted by this analysis, the correct operation of the
scheme is reliant on the accuracy of the events data and the process
of identifying dependencies between the individual events. There-
fore, in order to ensure correct operation of the intrusion detection
scheme, these aspects are required to be addressed comprehensively.
5 Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the network setup we have used to
evaluate the proposed intrusion detection system. The proposed
framework was implemented with the widely used operating system
for IoT i.e. Contiki OS [54, 55]. The evaluation was conducted using
Contiki v2.7 and its built-in emulator Cooja [56].
5.1 IoT Environment
The proposed IoT network is presented in Figure 4. It consists of a
border router (BR) that acts as the DODAG root for the 6loWPAN
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network and connects it to the Internet through a SLIP interface to a
computer. This computer node has higher processing power than the
HOST nodes in the 6loWPAN network. The BR can also be referred
to as an Edge Router.
The first tier of nodes that are a part of the 6LoWPAN are referred to
in this work as routers/IDS nodes and are used to implement the host-
based intrusion detection component. These nodes are responsible
for forwarding messages to the root as well as periodically sending
information regarding the behavior of other nodes in the network
located under them in the RPL tree. In this work, the router nodes are
always located one hop away from the root. The malicious node is
located in the second tier and can have access to the network through
one of the router nodes in the first tier. Its location can vary but in
the interests of simplicity, it will always fall two hops away from
the root. This is to ensure that all traffic originating from it will pass
through one of the router nodes.
R
BR
R RRR
BR
R
USB/SLIP
Wireless Link
Border/Edge 
Router
Router/IDS 
node
Malicious 
node
6LOWPAN
Possible 
location of the 
Malicious node
Fig. 4: IDS Proposed Topology.
Simulations were performed within the Cooja Emulator with
Tmote Sky Motes [57] as the chosen emulated motes. Tmote Sky
node use CC2420 IEEE802.15.4 radio transceiver with 250kbps data
rate operating in the 2.4GHz ISM band. Additionally, Tmote Sky has
48kb of flash and 10kb of RAM. The simulated network was created
with one BR, 5 router nodes, and one malicious node. The location
of the malicious node was changed between simulation runs to rep-
resent the dynamic nature of the IoT networks. However, due to the
performance of RPL, the information it sends is always forwarded to
its preferred parent, normally the router node closest to it. A snapshot
showing the topology as created with COOJA is shown in Figure 5,
where node 1 is the BR, nodes 2-6 are the IDS nodes, and node 7 is
the malicious node.
We initiated the experimentation by performing a set of simulations
in order to measure a baseline to be used to compare the perfor-
mance of the proposed IDS system. This is achieved by simulating
the network shown in the above-mentioned figure but without the
presence of the malicious node. Router nodes in the baseline setup
do not have any special additional code, they act as RPL routers and
exchange only RPL control messages between themselves and the
root. The baseline will be used to show the effect of the IDS system
on the limited resources of the motes.
Another, issue that has been taken into consideration is the Radio
Duty Cycle (RDC). In IoT networks, the rate of data transmission
is usually low as compared to other networks. Therefore, in order to
save the limited power of the nodes, it is not logical to keep the radio
on whilst there is no active transmission being conducted.
This triggered many RDC protocols that are designed specifically to
control the rate at which nodes can turn on or off their respective
radios throughout their lifetime. In Contiki OS, the prominent RDC
protocol is referred to as ContikiMAC. It takes into consideration the
sleep patterns of different nodes in the network when transmitting or
receiving. When there is a packet to send, the node in question turns
Fig. 5: IDS Proposed Topology.
on its radio, sends the packet, waits for an acknowledgment (ACK)
packet before turning off the radio and going back to sleep. If an
ACK packet is not received, a retransmission cycle starts that either
ends when an ACK is received or when the maximum number of
retransmissions is reached. Additionally, ContikiMAC periodically
turns on the radio to listen for transmissions or send updates regard-
ing the state of the network.
Contiki OS also features an RDC protocol that keeps the radio alive
regardless of active communication called NullRDC. In this paper,
we have simulated the network both with duty cycling using Con-
tikimac and without duty cycling using nullrdc. This is important as
different RDC can greatly change the power consumption pattern of
the node which may overshadow the effect of the IDS system.
Throughout this work, we have mainly focused on two parameters:
the extra power consumption of the intrusion detection system and
the extra memory footprint caused by adding the IDS features to the
router nodes. These two metrics are discussed in more detail in the
following subsections.
5.2 Power Measurements
As the nodes in a 6LowPAN network are usually resource con-
strained therefore any additional feature added to them will have to
take into consideration the extra power consumption it adds to the
nodes. Power measurements were made using the powertrace tool
included in Contiki OS [58]. This tool shows the time each node
spends in one of four states i.e. transmitting (Tx), receiving (Rx),
low power mode (LPM), and processing (CPU). Using these values,
the energy (E) of a node that is operating with a nominal voltage
(V) can be calculated by multiplying the time value for each state by
the current consumption of that respective state using the following
formula
E(mWs) = V ∗ (Tx ∗ 19.5 + Rx ∗ 21.8 + LPM ∗ 0.0545 + CPU ∗ 1.8)
(1)
The values in the above equation are taken from the Tmote Sky data
sheet and they are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Base measurement units for Tmote-Sky nodes.
Typical Operating Conditions MIN NOM MAX UNIT
Supply voltage 2.1 3.6 V
Supply voltage during flash memory 2.7 3.6 V
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio RX 21.8 23 mA
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio TX 19.5 21 mA
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio off 1800 2400 µA
Current Consumption: MCU idle, Radio off 54.5 1200 µA
Current Consumption: MCU standby 5.1 21.0 µA
The average power consumption of a single node can be calculated
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using the following formula.
Power(mW) =
Energy(mWs)
Time(s)
(2)
Which takes into consideration the real time each node was active.
Results obtained are discussed in Section 6.
5.3 RAM and ROM usage
Another scarce resource in low power networks (6LoWPAN) is the
memory of the nodes. As these nodes are cheap, small, and usu-
ally expendable, they do not come with great amount of memory.
As mentioned before with the tmote sky, it has only 48kb of flash
and 10kb of RAM. Therefore, we measured the footprint of the code
for the baseline setup and for the IDS setup to analyze the perfor-
mance impact of proposed system. Results for the baseline power
and energy consumptions are presented in the next section for both
with and without duty cycling.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we present and evaluate the results obtained for the
experimentation discussed in the previous section.
6.1 Power measurements
The experiments have been performed using COOJA emulator sim-
ulating the network presented in the previous section. For each
simulation run, the malicious node sends UDP packets to the border
router as its destination. Different settings of the transmission rate
were tested i.e. 1, 10, 100, and 1000 packets per second. Addition-
ally, two variations on the operation of IDS nodes were tested. The
first is when the IDS node sends an update to the Border Router (BR)
each time it receives 5 packets from the malicious node, referred as
IDS mode5 in the figures. The second case is when the number of
received packets is 10, presented as IDS mode10. This update mes-
sage is a UDP message containing the source and destination IP, the
source and destination port number of the malicious packets. This
update message will be referred as an IDS packet. As it holds the
information regarding all malicious packets sent, its size will depend
on the number of malicious packets sent from the malicious node.
Figures 6 - 9 demonstrate the power consumption of the IDS node
for the different scenarios simulated. The consumed power was mea-
sured after 5, 10, 15, and 20 minutes of run time with duty cycling
enabled. Each plot also includes the baseline power consumptions
that were measured when the nodes do not have any additional IDS
component, i.e they are operating as normal RPL nodes. This was
performed to provide an insight into the amount of power these
nodes consume to execute basic RPL code.
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Fig. 6: Power vs Time Consumption of the IDS node with duty
cycling.
As can be deduced from Figures 6 - 9, the power consumption
increases with the change in mode of operation for IDS node. This
is because the size of an IDS packet increases when the payload
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Fig. 7: Power vs Time Consumption of the IDS node with duty
cycling.
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Fig. 8: Power vs Time Consumption of the IDS node with duty
cycling.
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Fig. 9: Power vs Time Consumption of the IDS node with duty
cycling.
increases based on number of packets from the malicious node.
However, this increase is not significant to alter the overall power
consumption of the system.
Another observation is that measuring the power consumption at a
specific time intervals may be unfair because the number of packets
sent from the malicious node is not same for each scenario. There-
fore, we have also measured the power consumption at the instances
after a certain number of packets from the malicious node have been
received by the IDS node. This trend can be observed in Figures 10
- 13.
Additionally, we have tested the system without duty cycling, i.e.
when the radio is always on and nodes never sleep. As expected, the
results are almost equal for all the scenarios tested independently on
the transmission rate. This is because the CPU consumes negligible
power when compared with the power consumed by the radio. As
the radio is always turned on, we cannot really see the difference
in power consumption by the different scenarios. Nevertheless, the
results where the malicious node is sending with 1 packet/sec rate
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Fig. 10: Power Consumption vs Number of transmitted packets of
the IDS node with duty cycling.
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
5 10 15 20 
Po
we
r (
mW
) 
Time (minutes) 
10 Packets/sec  
Baseline  IDS mode5 IDS mode10 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
10pkts 100pkts 1000pkts 
Po
we
r (
mW
) 
No of packets 
10 Packets/sec  
IDS mode5 IDS mode10 
Fig. 11: Power Consumption vs Number of transmitted packets of
the IDS node with duty cycling.
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Fig. 12: Power Consumption vs Number of transmitted packets of
IDS node with duty cycling.
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Fig. 13: Power Consumption vs Number of transmitted packets of
IDS node with duty cycling.
are presented in the Figure 14.
6.2 Memory Overhead
As memory is an important resource on the node and therefore we
have performed experimentations to assess the effect of proposed
IDS component on a node. The memory footprint of the IDS module
has been measured for both the baseline setup and the IDS setup.
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Fig. 14: Power vs Time consumption for IDS node without duty
cycling.
Size of IDS
Packets
RAM
overhead
(Bytes)
ROM
overhead
(Bytes)
With Duty
Cycling
5 230 980
10 420 980
Without Duty
Cycling
5 230 980
10 420 980
Table 2 Memory Overhead caused by the IDS functionality.
The memory overhead caused by the adding IDS functionality to the
nodes is presented in Table 2.
The results of our experimentations demonstrate that packet size
for the proposed IDS does not affect the ROM overhead. This is
achieved as the IDS does not rely on that size. However, the RAM
footprint requirements increase with the IDS packet size as more
data will be saved in the memory to be sent at once. Furthermore,
it is observed that the overhead is agnostic of duty cycle protocol
employed as the additional application layer IDS is consistent across
the underlying protocols used.
7 Discussion
In IoT networks, the IDS can be placed in two places, at the edge
router or at the end host. The IDS placed at the edge router has
the capability of blocking malicious traffic at the network entry
point thus protect the end nodes from the malicious traffic. How-
ever, an IDS at the edge router might not consider the behaviour of
the devices themselves and may lead to high communication over-
heads between nodes and the edge router. On the other hand, an IDS
at the end nodes can monitor the performance of end nodes but it
requires high processing overheads resources (processing, storage,
and energy).
The existing IDSs for IoT networks are mostly isolated and mon-
itors a single device by performing analysis for the attacks on a local
device. There is no communication taking place between the nodes
to make a collaborative detection. The standalone system will not
detect most advanced and distributed attacks. Moreover, standalone
systems will not be able to correlate the traffic statistics or mali-
cious traffic passing through a number of devices at the same time.
Furthermore, the standalone IDS systems always perform the detec-
tion function with respect to seen traffic on its deployed node, thus
allowing the intruder to misuse the device for longer time periods.
Naturally, collaboration among devices could provide the effective
defense. In a collaborative system such as the one proposed in
this paper, the end devices or IDS at the nodes monitor the traf-
fic patterns and reports the events to the centralized or distributed
system for event correlation and feedback aggregation. This paper
represents the first attempt towards the design of collaborative intru-
sion detection system for the IoT network without incurring high
communication or computation overheads.
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Most current IDS approaches that have designed for IoT net-
works are mainly dependent on the underlying routing protocols
(6LoWPAN and RPL). To the best of our knowledge, no approach
is proposed that is generic and perform intrusion detection regard-
less of routing protocols. The work presented in this paper not only
can be applied to a variety of routing protocols, and incorporates
collaboration between nodes in the network for early and effective
detection of attacks in the resource-constrained network. Our mea-
surement results for RAM and energy consumptions reveals that the
approach is lightweight and can be used in the resource-constrained
set of devices. The total RAM size in the Tmote sky is 10 kb, hence
COLIDE system can be deployed with the ram capacity of only 230
bytes.In terms of energy overheads, our simulation results show that
the node requires only around 5mW of power for processing 1000
packets, which is negligible for the ultra-low power Tmote sky.
8 Conclusions
Security for IoT infrastructures is an emerging concern which
requires dedicated efforts to address it effectively. This paper has
focused on one specific challenge within security i.e. intrusion detec-
tion taking into account characteristics such as resource constraints
of the things and communication among these devices. The paper
has proposed a novel framework for intrusion detection which com-
bines host and network-based detection to achieve efficient intrusion
detection for IoT using 6LoWPAN.Furthermore, the paper repre-
sents pioneering effort to address the challenge of detecting multi-
stage attacks for IoT infrastructures by adopting a collaborative
approach. The paper has presented a detailed formal specification
and analysis of the proposed system to aid its implementation in a
real-life setting. The paper has also presented a detailed evaluation
of the system using Contiki and Cooja simulating different scenar-
ios to identify the overall efficiency achieved by it. Both formal and
empirical evaluation of the system demonstrate its effectiveness with
respect to efficient intrusion detection for IoT networks. We aim to
continue this work with security evaluation of the framework such
as detection accuracy and time being immediate consideration for
further work.
9 References
1 Gartner says 8.4 billion connected "things" will be in use in 2017, up 31 percent
from 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917
2 H. J. W. and T. P., “,compression format for ipv6 datagrams over ieee 802.15.4-
based networks,” 2011.
3 G. Mulligan, “The 6lowpan architecture,” in Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on
Embedded Networked Sensors, ser. EmNets ’07, 2007, pp. 78–82.
4 J. Olsson, “6lowpan demystified.” [Online]. Available:
http://www.ti.com/lit/wp/swry013/swry013.pdf
5 G. Montenegro, N. Kushalnagar, and D. Culler, “Transmission of ipv6 packets over
ieee 802.15.4 networks,” IETF RFC 4944.
6 D. Geer. The internet of things: Top five threats to iot
devices. [Online]. Available: http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134265/network-
security/the-internet-of-things–top-five-threats-to-iot-devices.html
7 H. S. Kim, J. Ko, D. E. Culler, and J. Paek, “Challenging the ipv6 routing protocol
for low-power and lossy networks (rpl): A survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys
Tutorials, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 2502–2525, 2017.
8 G. Glissa, A. Rachedi, and A. Meddeb, “A secure routing protocol based on
rpl for internet of things,” in 2016 IEEE Global Communications Conference
(GLOBECOM), 2016, pp. 1–7.
9 A. Mayzaud, R. Badonnel, and I. Chrisment, “A Taxonomy of Attacks in RPL-
based Internet of Things,” International Journal of Network Security, vol. 18, no. 3,
pp. 459 – 473„ May 2016. [Online]. Available: https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01207859
10 J. Arshad, M. Abdellatif, M. Khan, and M. Azad, “A novel framework for collabo-
rative intrusion detection for m2m networks,” in The 9th International Conference
on Information and Communication Systems, 2018.
11 G. Lu, B. Krishnamachari, and C. Raghavendra, “Performance evaluation of the
ieee 802.15.4 mac for low-rate low power wireless networks,” in Performance
computing and communications., 2004, pp. 701–706.
12 Z. Shelby and C. Bormann, “6lowpan the wireless embedded internet,” John Wiley
and Sons, 2009.
13 T. Clausen, A. C. d. Verdiere, J. Yi, A. Niktash, Y. Igarashi, H. Satoh, U. Herberg,
and C. Laven, “The lightweight on-demand ad hoc distance-vector routing protocol
- next generation (loadng),” IETF, 2016.
14 T. Winter, “Rpl: Ipv6 routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks,” IETF
RFC 6550, 2012.
15 “Survey on rpl enhancements: A focus on topology, security and mobility,”
Computer Communications, vol. 120, pp. 10 – 21, 2018.
16 A. Le, J. Loo, A. Lasebae, A. Vinel, Y. Chen, and M. Chai, “The impact of rank
attack on network topology of routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks,”
IEEE Sensors Journal, vol. 13, pp. 3685–3692, 2013.
17 W. Xie, M. Goyal, H. Hosseini, J. Martocci, Y. Bashir, E. Baccelli, and A. Durresi,
“Routing loops in dag-based low power and lossy networks,” in Proceedings of
2010 24th IEEE International Conference on Advanced Information Networking
and Applications, 2010, pp. 888–895.
18 A. Dvir, T. Holczer, and L. Butty?n, “Vera-version number and rank authentication
in rpl,” pp. 709–714, 2011.
19 L. Wallgren, “Routing attacks and countermeasures in the rpl-based internet of
things,” IJDSN, vol. 9, 2013.
20 H. Yih-Chun, P. Adrian, and B. J. David, “Wormhole attacks in wireless networks,”
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 24, pp. 370–380, 2006.
21 V. Mahajan, M. Natu, and A. Sethi, “Analysis of wormhole intrusion attacks in
manets,” in Proceedings of MILCOM 2008 - 2008 IEEE Military Communications
Conference, 2008, pp. 1–7.
22 D. N. Quan and L. Louise, “A simple and efficient detection of wormhole attacks,”
New Technologies, Mobility and Security, pp. 1–5, 2008.
23 C. Karlof and D. Wagner, “Secure routing in wireless sensor networks: attacks and
countermeasures,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 1, pp. 293–315, 2003.
24 R. Hummen, J. Hiller, H. Wirtz, M. Henze, H. Shafagh, and K. Wehrle, “6lowpan
fragmentation attacks and mitigation mechanisms,” in Proceedings of the Sixth
ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, ser.
WiSec ’13, 2013.
25 L. O’Donnell, “Partners warn against application layer ddos attacks targeting
iot devices,” Available online at: http://www.crn.com/news/internet-of-
things/300084491/partners-warn-against-application-layer-ddos-attacks-
targeting-iot-devices.htm?itc=refresh, 2017.
26 L. Chen, “Security management for the internet of things,” Electronic Theses and
Dissertations, 2017.
27 K. Mallikarjunan, K. Muthupriya, and S. Shalinie, “A survey of distributed denial
of service attack,” in Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Intelligent
System and Control, 2016.
28 M. Farooq, M. Waseem, A. Khairi, and S. Mazhar, “A critical analysis on the
security concerns of internet of things (iot),” International Journal of Computer
Applications, vol. 111, pp. 1–6, 2015.
29 J. Arshad and M. A. Azad, “Performance evaluation of secure on-demand routing
protocols for mobile ad-hoc networks,” in 2006 3rd Annual IEEE Communications
Society on Sensor and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, vol. 3, Sept 2006,
pp. 971–975.
30 A. Le, J. Loo, Y. Luo, and A. Lasebae, “Specification-based ids for securing rpl
from topology attacks,” in 2011 IFIP Wireless Days (WD), Oct 2011, pp. 1–3.
31 P. Kasinathan, G. Costamagna, H. Khaleel, C. Pastrone, and M. A. Spirito, “Demo:
An ids framework for internet of things empowered by 6lowpan,” in Proceedings
of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications Security,
2013, pp. 1337–1340.
32 A. Mayzaud, R. Badonnel, and I. Chrisment, “A distributed monitoring strategy
for detecting version number attacks in rpl-based networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Network and Service Management, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 472–486, 2017.
33 M. Sheikhan and H. Bostani, “A hybrid intrusion detection architecture for internet
of things,” in Proceedings of 8th International Symposium on Telecommunications
(IST), Sept 2016, pp. 601–606.
34 C. Cervantes, D. Poplade, M. Nogueira, and A. Santos, “Detection of sinkhole
attacks for supporting secure routing on 6lowpan for internet of things,” in Pro-
ceedings of 2015 IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Network
Management (IM), 2015.
35 P. Kasinathan, C. Pastrone, M. Spirito, and M. Vinkovits, “Denial-of-service detec-
tion in 6lowpan based internet of things,” in Proceedings of 2013 IEEE 9th
International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and
Communications (WiMob), Oct 2013, pp. 600–607.
36 C. Jun and C. Chi, “Design of complex event-processing ids in internet of things,”
in Proceedings of 2014 Sixth International Conference on Measuring Technology
and Mechatronics Automation, Jan 2014, pp. 226–229.
37 R. Shahid, W. Linus, and V. Thiemo, “Svelte: Real-time intrusion detection in the
internet of things,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 11, no. 8, pp. 2661 – 2674, 2013.
38 A. S. Obaid, S. Muhammad Shoaib, H. Choong Seon, and L. Sungwon, “Rides:
Robust intrusion detection system for ip-based ubiquitous sensor networks,” MDPI
Sensors, 2009.
39 A. Abduvaliyev, S. Lee, and Y. Lee, “Energy efficient hybrid intrusion detec-
tion system for wireless sensor networks,” in 2010 International Conference on
Electronics and Information Engineering, vol. 2, Aug 2010, pp. V2–25–V2–29.
40 L. Wenchao, Y. Ping, W. Yue, P. Li, and L. Jianhua, “A new intrusion detection
system based on knn classification algorithm in wireless sensor network,” Journal
of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2014.
41 A. Saeed, A. Ahmadinia, A. Javed, and H. Larijani, “Intelligent intrusion detection
in low-power iots,” ACM Transactions on Internet Technologies, vol. 16, pp. 27:1–
27:25, 2016.
42 J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. Silva, “Security for the internet of things: A survey
of existing protocols and open research issues,” IEEE Communications Surveys
Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1294–1312, 2015.
43 M. A. Azad, S. Bag, and F. Hao, “M2m-rep: Reputation of machines in the internet
of things,” in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Availability,
Reliability and Security, 2017, pp. 28:1–28:7.
44 J. Roux, E. Alata, G. Auriol, V. Nicomette, and M. Kaâniche, “Toward an
Intrusion Detection Approach for IoT based on Radio Communications Profiling,”
in Proceedings of 13th European Dependable Computing Conference. [Online].
Available: https://hal.laas.fr/hal-01561710
45 Z. A. Khan and P. Herrmann, “A trust based distributed intrusion detection mech-
anism for internet of things,” in Proceedings of 2017 IEEE 31st International
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–12
c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2015 11
Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA), 2017,
pp. 1169–1176.
46 Z. A. Khan, J. Ullrich, A. G. Voyiatzis, and P. Herrmann, “A trust-based resilient
routing mechanism for the internet of things,” in Proceedings of the 12th Inter-
national Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ser. ARES ’17,
2017.
47 I. R. Chen, J. Guo, and F. Bao, “Trust management for soa-based iot and its appli-
cation to service composition,” IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, vol. 9,
no. 3, pp. 482–495, 2016.
48 H. Sedjelmaci, S. m. Senouci, and T. Taleb, “An accurate security game for low-
resource iot devices,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. PP, no. 99,
pp. 1–1, 2017.
49 M. Chiang and T. Zhang, “Fog and iot: An overview of research opportunities,”
IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 854–864, Dec 2016.
50 F. Alserhani, M. Akhlaq, I. Awan, and A. C. MARS, “Multi-stage attack recogni-
tion system,” Proceedings of the 24th IEEE International Conference on Advanced
Information Networking and Applications, Perth, Australia, 2010.
51 M. W. F. S. Cheung, U. Lindqvist, “Modelling multistep cyber attacks for sce-
nario recognition,” in Proceedings of the 3rd DARPA Information Survivability
Conference and Exposition, Washington, D.C., 2003., 2003.
52 P. Ning and D. Xu, “Learning attack strategies from intrusion alerts,” in Proceed-
ings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ser.
CCS ’03, 2003, pp. 200–209.
53 S. O. Al-Mamory and H. L. Zhang, “A survey on ids alerts processing techniques,”
in Proceedings of the 6th WSEAS International Conference on Information Secu-
rity and Privacy, ser. ISP’07. Stevens Point, Wisconsin, USA: World Scientific
and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS), 2007, pp. 69–78.
54 A. Dunkels, B. Gronvall, and T. Voigt, “Contiki - a lightweight and flexible oper-
ating system for tiny networked sensors,” in Proceedings of 29th Annual IEEE
International Conference on Local Computer Networks, Nov 2004, pp. 455–462.
55 Y. B. Zikria, M. K. Afzal, F. Ishmanov, S. W. Kim, and H. Yu, “A survey on
routing protocols supported by the contiki internet of things operating system,”
Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. 82, pp. 200 – 219, 2018. [Online].
Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167739X17324299
56 F. Osterlind, A. Dunkels, J. Eriksson, N. Finne, and T. Voigt, “Cross-level sensor
network simulation with cooja,” in Proceedings of 31st Local computer networks.
IEEE, 2006, pp. 641–648.
57 “Tmote Sky,” in http://www.snm.ethz.ch/Projects/TmoteSky.
58 A. Dunkels, F. Osterlind, N. Tsiftes, and Z. He, “Software-based on-line energy
estimation for sensor nodes,” in Proceedings of the 4th workshop on Embedded
networked sensors. ACM, 2007, pp. 28–32.
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–12
12 c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2015
